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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature Of The Case  
 Tarango Deforest Padilla appeals from the district court’s judgment, on 
remand, entered upon the district court’s findings of fact and conclusions of law 
in which the court again determined that Padilla is not entitled to post-conviction 
relief on his claim that counsel was ineffective for failing to file a motion to 
suppress evidence obtained up to, and as part of, Padilla’s lawful detention.    
 
Statement Of Facts And Course Of Proceedings 
 
 The Idaho Court of Appeals described the facts underlying Padilla’s 
criminal convictions as follows: 
 At approximately 2:30 a.m. one morning in August 2009, 
Officer Matthew Gonzales, who was on routine patrol driving 
through an alley, saw Padilla and attempted to make contact with 
him.  Padilla fled and was subsequently found nearby lying on the 
ground under a tree.  During a search of Padilla, officers found two 
financial transaction cards (cards) that did not belong to Padilla and 
several spark plug pieces.[FN]  Officers found additional cards, 
spark plug pieces, and a flashlight upon searching the area where 
Padilla was pursued and ultimately detained.  Police contacted the 
owners of two of the cards, who both confirmed they left their cards 
in their respective unlocked vehicles the night before and the cards 
were missing.  Both victims denied knowing Padilla or giving him 
permission to use the cards. 
 
 Padilla was charged with two counts of grand theft, Idaho 
Code §§ 18-2403(1), 18-2407(1)(b), and with being a persistent 
violator, I.C. § 19-2514, in separate cases later consolidated for 
trial. . . .  
 
 The jury found Padilla guilty as charged. 
 
FN.  Officer Gonzales testified at trial that from his training, 
he was aware that ceramic spark plug pieces are often used 
by criminals to easily break car windows.  He testified he did 
not know of any legitimate reason a person would have such 
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items on his person.  
 
State v. Padilla, Docket Nos. 38899-38900, 2012 Unpublished Opinion No. 777 
at p.2 (Idaho App. Dec. 28, 2012).   
 Padilla filed a pro se petition for post-conviction relief in both cases and 
alleged, among other claims, that his attorney was ineffective for failing to file a 
motion to suppress.  (#41772/#41773 R.1, pp.13-21, 191-199.)  Padilla also filed 
a motion for the appointment of counsel, which the district court granted.  
(#41772/#41773 R., pp.22-26, 200-204.)  The court thereafter notified Padilla of 
its intent to dismiss his petition.  (#41772/#41773 R., pp.27-28, 205-206.)  With 
respect to Padilla’s claim that counsel was ineffective for failing to file a 
suppression motion, the court advised Padilla that he failed to identify, in his 
petition, any basis for suppression.  (#41772/#41773 R., pp.27, 205.)  In 
response, Padilla, with the assistance of counsel, filed an amended petition.  
(#41772/#41773 R., pp.46-49, 53-58, 232-237.)  In his amended petition, Padilla 
alleged, in relevant part, that counsel was ineffective in failing to file a motion to 
suppress, which motion he asserted should have been based on an allegedly 
illegal “Terry stop” and statements “made to police without a Miranda warning.”  
(#41772/#41773 R., pp.54, 233.)  The state filed an answer and a separate 
motion for summary dismissal.  (#41772/#41773 R., pp.59-61, 70-90, 238-241, 
252-273.)  The state also filed a motion to take judicial notice of several 
                                                          
1 The Idaho Supreme Court entered an order augmenting the record on appeal in 
this case with the “Clerk’s Record and Reporter’s Transcript filed electronically 
with this Court in consolidated appeal Nos. 41772 and 41773, Padilla v. State 
(Twin Falls County Nos. CV-2013-1782 and CV-2013-1783).”  (7/14/15 Order 




documents related to Padilla’s underlying criminal cases, as did Padilla.2  
(#41772/#41773 R., pp.67-69 (state’s motion), 94-141 (Padilla’s motion and 
attachments), 146-148 (state’s amended motion).)         
 Although the state requested summary dismissal, the court did not rule on 
that motion but instead conducted an evidentiary hearing at which Padilla 
withdrew his claim that counsel was ineffective for failing to file a motion to 
suppress based on Miranda, but maintained his claim that suppression should 
have been sought based on the alleged absence of reasonable articulable 
suspicion to support his detention as required under Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 
(1968).  (#41772/#41773 Tr., p.15, L.24 – p.16, L.9.)  After the hearing, the court 
entered a written decision denying relief and a separate Judgment dismissing 
Padilla’s petition.  (#41772/#41773 R., pp.154-165, 288-299.)  On this claim, the 
district court stated, in relevant part:   
Even assuming that there was no basis for a Terry stop/frisk as 
Padilla suggests, police would have had the right to search him 
following his arrest on the warrant.  This doctrine coupled with the 
inevitable discovery doctrine would have resulted in denial of any 
suppression motion.  He further argues that a flashlight found near 
the scene should have been suppressed.  The flashlight was not 
found on his person.  Padilla has made no showing that he had any 
expectation of privacy in this item.  Any suppression motion 
regarding this item would have been futile. 
 
                                                          
2 At the outset of the evidentiary hearing, the court addressed the parties’ request 
for judicial notice and ultimately admitted the documents that were the subject of 




(#41772/#41773 R., pp.162, 294.)  Padilla filed a timely notice of appeal.3  
(#41772/#41773 R., pp.167-169, 301-302.)    
 Padilla raised a single issue in his post-conviction appeal:  Whether the 
district court erred in denying relief on Padilla’s claim that counsel was ineffective 
for failing to file a motion to suppress.  (#41772/#41773 Appellant’s Brief, p.5.)  
More specifically, Padilla argued counsel should have requested suppression 
based on the alleged lack of reasonable suspicion to detain him.  
(#41772/#41773 Appellant’s Brief, pp.7-11.)  The Court of Appeals first found that 
because the “evidence at issue originated from the search that occurred prior to 
the discovery of the arrest warrant  . . . if the seizure of Padilla was unlawful, then 
the evidence resulting from the search prior to the discovery of the search 
warrant would not be admissible under the attenuation doctrine because the 
unearthing of the arrest warrant was not an intervening circumstance.”  Padilla v. 
State, 158 Idaho 184, 188-189, 345 P.3d 243, 247-248 (Ct. App. 2014).  
Addressing the legality of the seizure, the Court of Appeals concluded the district 
court failed to make findings necessary to resolve the factual disputes related to 
the “failure to file a motion to suppress theory” raised by Padilla and failed to 
make “conclusions of law in relation to this theory, except to say that the 
evidence would have been admissible even If the investigatory stop were 
                                                          
3 Although technically two separate cases, Padilla’s single petition filed in relation 
to both underlying criminal cases was litigated in the same proceeding and the 
cases have been consolidated on appeal.  (#41772/#41773 R., pp.177-178, 314-
315; #41772/#41773 Tr., p.5, Ls.13-14 (court noting that the cases were “set for 




unlawful.”  Id. at 191, 345 P.3d at 250.4  The factual disputes identified by the 
Court of Appeals included the officer’s observations of Padilla’s behavior as 
compared to Padilla’s claims about what he thought, saw, and heard (or did not 
hear).  Id.  “Thus,” the Court “remand[ed] the case to the district court to make 
the requisite factual findings.”  Id.  “With these factual findings,” the Court of 
Appeals advised the district court it “could also make conclusions of law including 
(a) whether it would have been objectively reasonable for defense counsel to file 
a motion to suppress, arguing that officers lacked reasonable suspicion under the 
totality of the circumstances, and (b) whether there is a reasonable probability 
that the outcome of the proceedings would have been different had counsel filed 
a motion to suppress.”  Id. 
 The state filed a petition for review. (#41772/#41773 Respondent’s Brief in 
Support of Petition for Review.)  The basis for the state’s request was that the 
record and the applicable law showed there were no relevant factual disputes for 
the district court to resolve because the standard under the Fourth Amendment 
for investigatory detentions is an objective one that is based on the information 
available to the officer, not Padilla’s thoughts or his reasons for fleeing.  (Id. at 
11.)  The state also noted the Court of Appeals’ erroneous statement that, on 
remand, the district court could make a “conclusion[ ] of law” about “whether it 
would have been objectively reasonable for defense counsel to file a motion to 
                                                          
4 The Court of Appeals declined to consider the state’s assertion that the “officers 
had probable cause to arrest Padilla based on their finding financial transaction 
cards and ceramic spark plug pieces on the ground near Padilla” because the 
claim was made at oral argument and was not considered by the district court.  
Id. at 188 n.3, 345 P.3d at 247 n.3. 
6 
 
suppress,” Padilla, 158 Idaho at 191, 345 P.3d at 250, because the correct 
standard is whether counsel’s performance was objectively unreasonable, not 
whether it would have been objectively reasonable for him to do something 
different.5  (#41772/#41773 Respondent’s Brief in Support of Petition for Review, 
p.21 n.5.)  The Idaho Supreme Court denied the state’s request for review.  
(#41772/#41773 Order Denying Petition for Review.) 
 On remand, the state filed a motion to dismiss and asked the district court 
to “make factual findings based upon the record before the court, and 
conclusions of law based on those factual findings.”  (R., pp.31, 106.)  Padilla 
filed a response after which the court entered its “Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law.”  (R., pp.48-62, 123-137.)  The district court entered an 
“Amended Judgment” again dismissing Padilla’s petition and Padilla timely 




                                                          
5 Padilla concedes that “the Court of Appeals’ statement of the law sets a new 
standard more favorable to petitioners than the Strickland standard,” but 
contends it is “law of the case.”  (Opening Brief of Appellant, pp.8-9.)  Padilla, 
however, cites no authority that actually supports the proposition that a party is 
entitled to application of an incorrect legal standard.  (Id.)  The state will, 
therefore, address Padilla’s arguments under the correct standard as Padilla has 




 Padilla states the issue on appeal as:  
 
Did the District Court err in denying Mr. Padilla’s petition for post-
conviction relief because trial counsel was ineffective in failing to 
move to suppress unconstitutionally obtained evidence?  
 
(Opening Brief of Appellant (“Appellant’s Brief”), p.6.) 
  
 
The state rephrases the issue on appeal as: 
 
Do the district court’s findings of fact and conclusions of law support its 
conclusion that Padilla is not entitled to relief on his post-conviction claim that 
counsel was ineffective for failing to file a motion to suppress evidence obtained 

































Padilla Has Failed To Show Error In the District Court’s Findings Of Fact And 
Conclusions Of Law, Entered Following Remand, On Padilla’s Claim That 
Counsel Was Ineffective For Failing To File A Suppression Motion That Would 
Have Been Denied 
 
A. Introduction 
Padilla contends the district court’s factual findings and conclusions of law 
do not support its conclusion that Padilla was not entitled to relief on his claim 
that counsel was ineffective for failing to file a motion to suppress based on an 
allegedly unlawful detention.  (Appellant’s Brief, pp.7-19.)  Application of the 
correct legal standards to the evidence presented shows Padilla has failed to 
meet his burden of showing error.  The district court correctly concluded that a 
motion to suppress would have been denied.     
 
B. Standard Of Review 
“Applications for post-conviction relief under the UPCPA initiate civil 
proceedings in which, like a civil plaintiff, the applicant must prove his or her 
allegations by a preponderance of the evidence.”  McKay v. State, 148 Idaho 
567, 570, 225 P.3d 700, 703 (2010) (citing Hauschulz v. State, 144 Idaho 834, 
838, 172 P.3d 1109, 1113 (2007); I.C.R. 57(c)).     
 When the district court conducts an evidentiary hearing and enters 
findings of fact and conclusions of law, an appellate court will disturb the findings 
of fact only if they are clearly erroneous, but will freely review the conclusions of 
law drawn by the district court from those facts.  Mitchell v. State, 132 Idaho 274, 
276-77, 971 P.2d 727, 729-730 (1998).  A trial court’s decision that a post-
9 
 
conviction petitioner has not met his burden of proof is entitled to great weight.  
Sanders v. State, 117 Idaho 939, 940, 792 P.2d 964, 965 (Ct. App. 1990).   
 The credibility of the witnesses, the weight to be given to their testimony, 
and the inferences to be drawn from the evidence are all matters solely within the 
province of the district court.  Peterson v. State, 139 Idaho 95, 97, 73 P.3d 108, 
110 (Ct. App. 2003).   
 
C. Padilla Failed To Meet His Burden Of Establishing Counsel Was 
Ineffective For Failing To File A Suppression Motion 
 
In order to prove a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a post-
conviction petitioner must demonstrate both deficient performance and resulting 
prejudice.  Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-88 (1984); State v. 
Charboneau, 116 Idaho 129, 137, 774 P.2d 299, 307 (1989).  With respect to the 
deficient performance prong, the United States Supreme Court has articulated 
the defendant’s burden under Strickland as follows: 
To establish deficient performance, a person challenging a 
conviction must show that counsel’s representation fell below an 
objective standard of reasonableness.  A court considering a claim 
of ineffective assistance must apply a strong presumption that 
counsel’s representation was within the wide range of reasonable 
professional assistance.  The challenger’s burden is to show that 
counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as 
the counsel guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment. 
 
Harrington v. Richter, 131 S.Ct. 770, 787 (2011) (citations and quotations 
omitted).   
To establish prejudice, a defendant must show a reasonable probability 
that, but for counsel’s deficient performance, the outcome of the proceeding 
would have been different.  Richter, 131 S.Ct. at 787.  “A reasonable probability 
10 
 
is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.”  Id. (citations 
and quotations omitted).  When a post-conviction petitioner claims his counsel 
was ineffective for failing to file a motion in his underlying criminal case, the court 
“may consider the probability of success of the motion in question in determining 
whether the attorney’s inactivity constituted incompetent performance.”  Sanchez 
v. State, 127 Idaho 709, 713, 905 P.2d 642, 646 (Ct. App. 1995); see also 
Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477 U.S. 365, 375 (1986) (“Where defense counsel’s 
failure to litigate a Fourth Amendment claim competently is the principal 
allegation of ineffectiveness, the defendant must also prove that his Fourth 
Amendment claim is meritorious . . ..”).  “Where the alleged deficiency is 
counsel’s failure to file a motion, a conclusion that the motion, if pursued, would 
not have been granted by the trial court, is generally determinative of both prongs 
of the test.”  Sanchez, 127 Idaho at 713, 905 P.2d at 646.  “If the motion lacked 
merit and would have been denied, counsel ordinarily would not be deficient for 
failing to pursue it, and, concomitantly, the petitioner could not have been 
prejudiced by the want of his pursuit.”  Id. 
On remand, the district court made the following factual findings with 
respect to Padilla’s claim that counsel was ineffective for failing to file a motion to 
suppress based upon Padilla’s allegedly unlawful detention: 
Near 2 A.M. on the date of his arrest Padilla left the home of 
an acquaintance to walk to his home approximately two blocks 
away.  As he walked down an alleyway he heard a vehicle come at 
him at a “rate of speed that startled” him.  That vehicle was in fact a 
police cruiser.  The police car, operated by Officer Gonzales, did 
not initially have its headlights or overhead lights on.  The police 
officer was “patrolling” the alley way as part of his regular duties.  
Gonzales observed that Padilla was “shuffling” and doing some 
11 
 
“fumbling around”.  Gonzales turned on his headlights, but not his 
overhead lights.  He turned his vehicle so that Padilla could see 
that it was a clearly marked police car.  Padilla “turned and looked” 
at Gonzales as he was getting out of his police car.  Padilla thought 
that he was going to “get jumped” by someone and began running.  
Gonzales shouted at Padilla several times to stop.  Padilla didn’t 
hear the officer say stop.  Rather, he continued running.  He 
jumped over a fence and twisted his ankle and fell in some bushes.  
As he lay in the bushes after he fell, he “tossed everything that [he] 
thought [he] didn’t want found on [him] in the bushes.”  These items 
included a credit card and pieces of a spark plug. 
 
Another police officer, Officer Schlund, heard Gonzales radio 
call for assistance and located Padilla where he had fallen.  He was 
immediately handcuffed.  He was patted down for weapons but no 
weapons were found.  While Padilla was detained by other officers, 
Gonzales searched the area where Padilla had been.  He found a 
credit card belonging to Mr. Mauch, some money, and some 
ceramic pieces from a spark plug.[FN]  Gonzales knew based upon 
his training and experience that spark plugs can be used to break 
windows on automobiles.  All of these found items “were clean and 
appeared to have just been placed there.”  Gonzales then searched 
Padilla’s person without a warrant and found two credit cards 
belonging to Ms. Labrum and some more pieces of a spark plug.  
The three credit cards and the spark plug pieces from Padilla’s 
person were admitted as evidence at trial.  The pieces of the spark 
plug found on the ground were also admitted.  [Footnote omitted.]  
After finding these items Gonzales retraced the direction that 
Padilla came from and found a flashlight in the yard that he chased 
Padilla through.  This item was also admitted at trial.     
 
[FN] The record is unclear whether Gonzales found more than 
one credit card next to Padilla in the bushes, but it is clear 




 The district court also made several conclusions of law, including:  (1) the 
evidentiary items found on the ground near Padilla would not have been 
suppressed because Padilla abandoned the items or, to the extent he disclaimed 
ownership, he had no standing to seek suppression of them; (2) the investigatory 
12 
 
detention was supported by reasonable articulable suspicion; and (3) the officers 
had probable cause to arrest Padilla and search him incident to that arrest.  (R., 
pp.56-61.)   
 Padilla contends the district court’s legal conclusion regarding the 
detention is incorrect, claiming that “[t]o use flight as a ground for suspicion to 
support the seizure, the State had the burden to show that (1) [he] knew the 
police were present; and (2) that the police believed that he was aware of their 
presence.”  (Appellant’s Brief, p.12.)  This argument fails.   
 It is well-settled that a police officer may, in compliance with the Fourth 
Amendment, make an investigatory stop of an individual if that officer entertains 
a reasonable suspicion that criminal activity is underway.  State v. Gallegos, 120 
Idaho 894, 896, 821 P.2d 949, 951 (1991); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).  The 
“reasonable suspicion” standard is an objective test that is satisfied if law 
enforcement can articulate specific facts which, along with the reasonable 
inferences from those facts, justify the suspicion that the person detained is or 
has been involved in criminal activity.  State v. Nickerson, 132 Idaho 406, 408, 
973 P.2d 758, 760 (Ct. App. 1999); Gallegos, 120 Idaho at 896-897, 821 P.2d at 
951-952.  Reasonable suspicion is a less demanding standard than probable 
cause.  Gallegos, 120 Idaho at 896, 821 P.2d at 951.   Although a series of facts 
may appear innocent when viewed separately, they may warrant further 
investigation when viewed together. State v. Brumfield, 136 Idaho 913, 917, 42 
P.3d 706, 710 (Ct. App. 2001).  “Whether an officer possessed reasonable 
suspicion is evaluated based on the totality of the circumstances known to the 
13 
 
officer at or before the time of the stop.”  State v. Bishop, 146 Idaho 804, 811, 
203 P.3d 1203, 1210 (2008) (citation omitted).  
 Unprovoked flight is a highly relevant factor to be considered in analyzing 
whether there is reasonable articulable suspicion to support an investigatory 
detention.  In Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 124 (2000), the Supreme Court 
aptly noted:  “Headlong flight—wherever it occurs—is the consummate act of 
evasion:  It is not necessarily indicative of wrongdoing, but it is certainly 
suggestive of such.”  Thus, while an individual undoubtedly has “a right to ignore 
the police and go about his business” when an officer approaches and doing so 
does not provide a justification for a detention or seizure, “unprovoked flight is 
simply not a mere refusal to cooperate.  Flight, by its very nature, is not ‘going 
about one’s business’; in fact, it is just the opposite.”  Wardlow, 528 U.S. at 125.  
“Allowing officers confronted with such flight to stop the fugitive and investigate 
further is quite consistent with the individual’s right to go about his business or to 
stay put and remain silent in the face of police questioning.”  Id.   
After “shuffling” and “fumbling around” in an alley at around 2:00 in the 
morning, and upon noticing Officer Gonzales’ patrol car, Padilla fled – 
unprovoked.  Although Officer Gonzales was going to attempt to make contact 
with Padilla after seeing him in the alley, Officer Gonzales did not detain Padilla 
for purposes of the Fourth Amendment until after Padilla’s unprovoked “headlong 
flight” and subsequent discovery of him in the bushes.  See State v. Agundis, 127 
Idaho 587, 593, 903 P.2d 752, 758 (Ct. App. 1995) (an individual is not seized 
until he submits to law enforcement’s show of authority).  “[C]ommonsense 
14 
 
judgments and inferences about human behavior” gave Officer Gonzales 
reasonable suspicion to detain Padilla and confirm or dispel any suspicion that 
he had been engaged in criminal activity.  Wardlow, 528 U.S. at 125 (citation 
omitted).  Padilla’s entire behavior, from “shuffling” and “fumbling around” in the 
alley at around 2:00 in the morning, to fleeing when he saw Officer Gonzales, to 
“laying” in the bushes, was more than adequate to give Officer Gonzales 
reasonable articulable suspicion to detain him.        
Padilla’s assertion that the state has the burden of proving he “knew the 
police were present” and “that the police believed that he was aware of their 
presence” is based on the Iowa Supreme Court’s opinion in State v. Kreps, 650 
N.W.2d 636 (Iowa 2002).  The Iowa Supreme Court’s opinion on what is required 
is, of course, not binding on this Court.  Even accepting Kreps as persuasive 
authority, Padilla’s assertion regarding the state’s alleged burden of proof is not 
entirely accurate.  The state is not required to show that Padilla in fact knew the 
police were present.  As correctly noted elsewhere in Padilla’s brief, what the 
court in Kreps said was that “[f]or flight to constitute grounds for suspicion, the 
circumstances surrounding the suspect’s efforts to avoid the police must be such 
as to allow a rational conclusion that flight indicated a consciousness of guilt,” 
and such conclusion “can only be drawn if there is evidence permitting a 
reasonable inference that (1) the suspect knew the police were present and (2) 
the police believed that the suspect was aware of police presence.”  Kreps, 650 
N.W.2d at 644 (citations omitted, emphasis added).  Moreover, it appears the 
court in Kreps applies this standard when flight is the only grounds for the 
15 
 
detention.  Kreps, 650 N.W.2d at 643 (“The difficult question here is whether 
such flight in and of itself justifies an investigatory stop.”).  In this case, Padilla’s 
detention was not based upon flight alone, but was also based on his conduct in 
the alley and the fact he was found in the bushes.  Nevertheless, applying the 
two-part test from Kreps, there was evidence from which a reasonable inference 
could be drawn that Padilla knew the police were present and that the police 
believed he was aware of their presence.   
The district court noted Padilla’s contention that he was unaware that 
Officer Gonzales was a member of law enforcement and was driving a marked 
patrol car.  (R., p.58.)  The court, however, found this testimony was not credible, 
specifically noting other testimony in which Padilla stated: 
I don’t recall any cards being on me ‘cause the cards I found on the 
ground were in one pocket, and when I was laying in the bushes, I 
thought I was trying to make sure I didn’t have nothing on me in 
case I got found.  I mean, it wasn’t—I had a misdemeanor warrant 
for a misdemeanor DUI at that time also, so I was panicking.  I 
didn’t want to pick up more charges because I thought I might have 
some weed on me.  So I felt—I tossed everything that I thought I 
didn’t want found on me into the bushes. 
 
(R., p.59 (quoting Tr., p.41, L.25 – p.42, L.9 (emphasis original).)  Thus, the 
district court concluded:  “The relationship between the officer’s presence and 
Padilla’s flight was causal rather than coincidental, shows a consciousness of 
guilt, and justifies an investigatory detention for someone running from the police 
at 2 A.M. and jumping over fences.”  (R., p.59.)     
 Padilla contends the district court’s findings “do not support a conclusion 
that [he] knew the police were present or that the police believed that [he] was 
aware of their presence.”  (Appellant’s Brief, p.13.)  According to Padilla, this is 
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so because “[a] finding that [he] ‘could have’ seen the police car is not the same 
as a finding that he did see the car and recognized it as such.”  (Appellant’s Brief, 
p.13.)  In addition to the fact that this argument misstates the court’s finding given 
that the court did not say “could have,” it said “could see,” the argument ignores 
that the Kreps test only requires evidence from which the court can draw a 
reasonable inference that Padilla knew the police were present, not a finding that 
Padilla in fact saw “the car and recognized it as such.”  Padilla’s complaint that 
the court did not find that Padilla in fact recognized Officer Gonzales suffers from 
the same flaw.  (Appellant’s Brief, p.13.)   
 Padilla also argues that the district court failed to make a finding that 
“Officer Gonzales believed that Mr. Padilla knew that he was a police officer.”  
(Appellant’s Brief, p.14.)  This argument ignores the entire point of the district 
court’s factual findings that Officer Gonzales “turned his vehicle so that Padilla 
could see that it was a clearly marked police car,” that “Padilla ‘turned and 
looked’ at [Officer] Gonzales as he was getting out of his police car,” and that 
Officer “Gonzales shouted at Padilla several times to stop.”  (R., p.55.) 
 With respect to the court’s findings regarding Padilla’s other behavior, in 
addition to his flight, Padilla complains that he “has searched the record and 
cannot find any statement anywhere from Officer Gonzales that Mr. Padilla was 
‘shuffling,’” and further complains that “even assuming [he] was shuffling, 
whatever that means, and fumbling in his own neighborhood in the night, that is 
not indicative of a reasonable articulable suspicion of criminal activity.”  
(Appellant’s Brief, p.14.)  Padilla is incorrect. 
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At trial, Officer Gonzales testified that “as [Padilla] entered the alley, he 
walked a short ways down, did some shuffling, some fumbling around, while 
he was in the alley, came out of the alley and began walking southbound again 
on the sidewalk.”  (#41773, Exhibit 15 (#38899 Tr., p.73, Ls.5-10) (emphasis 
added).)  The trial transcript was admitted at the post-conviction evidentiary 
hearing (R., pp.146-17, 150; Exhibit 15), and was considered by the district court 
in making its findings of fact and conclusions of law (see R., p.55).  Padilla’s 
attempts to parse through the court’s findings and evaluate them individually 
ignores the applicable legal standard for determining whether the totality of the 
circumstances supports a finding of reasonable articulable suspicion.       
 Padilla’s complaints that the district court’s factual findings were 
insufficient to support its conclusion that there was reasonable articulable 
suspicion to support Padilla’s detention fail.   
 Padilla also challenges the district court’s determination that the items 
Padilla abandoned would not be subject to suppression.  (Appellant’s Brief, p.17.)  
More specifically, Padilla argues that by laying in the bushes, he submitted to 
Officer Gonzales, and by throwing the items after he was in the bushes, their 
abandonment was involuntary.  (Appellant’s Brief, pp.17-18.)  This argument fails 
for two reasons.  First, “laying” in the bushes hardly constitutes submission to an 
officer’s show of authority.  Even accepting Padilla’s claim that he fell there, as 
found by the district court (R., p.55), he was not submitting to law enforcement by 
continuing to lay there after he fell.  Indeed, as Officer Timothy Schlund testified 
at trial, he found Padilla laying there only after searching the area, not because 
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Padilla submitted to his authority.  (#38899 Tr., p.59, Ls.7-15, p.61, Ls.17-25.)  
And, Padilla himself testified at the evidentiary hearing that he stopped because 
he “was hurt,” not because the police stopped him.  (Tr., p.40, Ls.20-23.)  It is 
hard to fathom how the police could seize Padilla from the moment he went into 
the bushes given that the police were not even present at that time. 
 Second, there is no evidence that Padilla discarded any items as a result 
of police misconduct.  Padilla testified that he threw the items after he was in the 
bushes because he “was trying to make sure [he] didn’t have nothing on [him] in 
case [he] got found.”  (Tr., p.41, L.25 – p.42, L.4.)  It is obvious from this 
statement that he threw the items before the police discovered him under the 
bushes.  The police did not engage in any misconduct that would render this act 
of abandonment involuntary.  To the contrary, the act was an entirely voluntary 
effort by Padilla to distance himself from incriminating evidence “in case [he] got 
found.”      
 Finally, Padilla contends the district court erred in finding there was 
probable cause to arrest him.  (Appellant’s Brief, p.18.)  This entire argument 
appears to be premised on the assertion that the seizure was “unconstitutional.”  
(Appellant’s Brief, p.18.)  For the reasons already stated, Padilla’s unlawful 
seizure claim fails.  As such, his probable cause argument necessarily fails.      
 The district court correctly concluded that Padilla failed to prove trial 
counsel was ineffective for failing to file a motion to suppress.  Padilla has failed 






 The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm the district court’s 
judgment dismissing Padilla’s petition for post-conviction relief. 
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